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This special issue of Global Media & China critically examines the current fascination with index-
ing, mapping, ranking and metrics worldwide as they apply to nations, regions, municipalities, 
publications and even citizens. We now live in age of information abundance. This abundance has 
in turn generated enthusiasm for increasing scrutiny of data, big and small. Many questions there-
fore arise: how valid is the measurement? Who benefits from the accumulation of data? And in this 
age of constant evaluation, is there any way for individuals to avoid their performance being 
ranked, their web browsing history monitored and their daily movements subject to surveillance?
Globally, organizations are investing resources in measuring, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, the success and impact of activities on a national level. This has given rise to a whole new 
industry that conducts longitudinal studies and feeds interest in where a nation is positioned in 
global rankings. Governments use their country’s position in these rankings as an indication of 
attraction; a rise in global rankings is good news, unless this represents a negative indicator, such 
as pollution or press freedom. Rankings seek to measure a range of issues, including social pro-
gress, innovation, happiness, food security, Internet access and connection speeds and pop culture 
exports. It seems that today everything is quantifiable.
One of the most pervasive indicators of national reputation is soft power, with organizations 
such as Portland developing rankings for institutions including the Annenberg School of 
Communication, the British Council and the government of Wales. Meanwhile, Monocle magazine 
publishes its own soft power rankings at the end of each year. These surveys reflect an obsession 
with rankings that reinforces the mistaken assumption that soft power is little more than nation 
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branding or a popularity contest. At the same time, the preference for easily measurable ‘outputs’ 
– how many viewers watch a particular international television broadcaster and how many interna-
tional students are studying in our education system – rather than ‘impacts’ (what do viewers or 
students actually think and feel about their interactions?) means we receive a mere snapshot of soft 
power capacity. This makes the evaluation of soft power strategies by quantitative methods diffi-
cult and dependent on minimum information, denying access to a comprehensive analysis of how 
audiences are responding (or not) to soft power initiatives.
Some have argued that China’s soft power and social progress rankings would be far higher if 
they were measured according to values endorsed by the Chinese government rather than by the 
more liberal norms of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) institu-
tions. Moreover, measurement itself reveals little about the emotional response of audiences to 
cultural products or their engagement with political institutions. Clearly, we need to pay more 
attention to qualitative rather than quantitative research if we wish to know how and why audiences 
engage with a particular country or government.
Rankings in history
The use of intricate systems of records to track people’s activities, register economic progress and 
calculate the movement of populations dates back to the ancient society of Mesopotamia, geo-
graphically located in a territory now shared by Iraq, Kuwait and parts of Syria. John Lent writes 
about how Mesopotamian society invented a writing script to make lists of items such as ‘receipts 
of tribute, itemization of war booty, distribution of rations, and payments to officials’ (Lent, 2017).
Another nation to make significant advances in record keeping was China. Valerie Hansen 
(2012), in a magisterial anthropology of the ancient Silk Roads of the Han Dynasty, describes how 
meticulous records were kept of delegations leaving and entering China. By then, the Chinese had 
developed a hieroglyphic language that has changed little over centuries, as well as inheriting the 
zero symbol of the Arabs by the 14th century. Chinese systems of imperial record keeping led to 
the bureaucratization of governance and the idea of the welfare state (Woodside, 2006), the latter 
idea becoming a mainstay of Western governance by the 20th century.
Metrics and performance indicators, according to Jerry Muller (2018), author of The Tyranny of 
Metrics, have become cultural memes. ‘Embracing them’, he says, ‘promises a seat on the train of 
historical progress’. Metrics are gathered by people referred to disparagingly as ‘bean counters’. 
Their counting does hold the promise of better outcomes, better policy and better business deci-
sions a lot of the time. However, much of the time, wrong questions are being asked, resulting in 
gaps in data and misleading comparisons, simply because counting tangibles is far easier than 
designing methods to measure the impact of intangibles. Perhaps most worrying is the fact that 
surveys can be devised to ‘game the system’, that is, to produce results that appear valid to the non-
expert, and even to academics.
Muller locates the birth of performance metrics in the education system in Victorian Britain in 
the 1860s. This was the time of the great British cultural reformer Matthew Arnold, who developed 
a theory of how ordinary people could be elevated by a system of learning not dissimilar to the 
Chinese model of exposure to the great Confucian books. Arnold was opposed to rewards based on 
results, which was introduced as a means to encourage schools to improve performance. Later on, 
in the United States, the baton of performance metrics was taken up by Robert McNamara, who 
was US Secretary of Defense during the period of the Vietnam War and went on to become the 
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president of the World Bank. His introduction of body counts to register success on the battlefield 
in Vietnam was anathema, even to many US generals who saw this as an inaccurate measure that 
distorted political and popular opinions of the war’s progress.
Modern society has taken record keeping to extreme limits. Today, people live in a data-satu-
rated society. It seems that people’s activities are constantly screened by both governments 
through social welfare systems and by corporate ‘bean counters’. In the modern university sys-
tem, researchers’ outputs are now tracked, mapped, indexed and used as ‘key performance indica-
tors’ that allow comparisons among colleagues and across institutions. Universities compete to 
climb global rankings, and this is only achievable if researchers and academics have dynamic 
international profiles.
In the sphere of business, regions and cities are subject to analysis in an effort to understand the 
growing influence of subnational actors, for instance, the movements of populations that might 
contribute to a region or city’s talent base or investment readiness. Rankings also compare cities 
according to their liveability, global connectivity, friendliness, cultural diversity and creativity.
Today, ‘big data’ is accelerating the trend, harvesting large volumes of raw data from indi-
viduals. With the use of information technologies, these data are converted into knowledge 
outputs, for instance, rankings of countries, cities and movies. Data are then visualized, that 
is, presented in a more readable friendly format for politicians and business leaders to share. 
Scholars working across the social sciences and the humanities are complicit in creating 
masses of data, often without agreeing on what those data are or the criteria for their evalua-
tion (Borgman, 2015, p. xviii).
The methodology behind such metrics has attracted less attention than the rankings themselves, 
though understanding this is crucial for our interpretation of the data. Data gleaned from research 
can be used for specific agendas and is open to manipulation, depending on what organization or 
government agency is commissioning the research. In recent years, the rising vocation of ‘data 
scientists’ is indicative of a global preoccupation with data.
On a more mundane level, social media apps allow consumers to rank restaurants, ride sharing 
trips, travel providers, doctors, dentists, health providers and even masseurs. Based on recommen-
dations from ‘peers’, people make decisions that previously might have been educated guesses. 
People derive a sense of agency from the freedom to rank choices, but this in turn allows busi-
nesses to send us information that we probably don’t need. The ‘democratisation’ of rankings also 
feeds the suspicion of expert opinion that has been so crucial to the rise of populist politics across 
the world. Why do we need to trust professional journalists, commentators, restaurant critics or 
film reviewers when we can all share our own opinions with a potential global audience? When 
asked ‘who do you trust?’ increasingly, the answer is ‘people like me’, and the notion that ‘the 
people know best’ is at the heart of populist political campaigns. Advertising and politics have long 
been based on metrics to convince audiences of expert opinion – 9 out of 10 cats prefer our brand 
of cat food, 78% of consumers agree that our shampoo alleviated their dandruff problem – so today, 
it is a little surprising that those very same metrics are often used to undermine the authority of 
experts.
There are four papers in this special issue. In the first paper, Alberto Carrera locates the birth 
of city rankings in the evolution of the economic press, the consolidation of mercantilism and the 
development of financial capitalism in Europe from the 16th to 18th century. The paper is nota-
ble first for its historical contextualization, and second, a regional case study of city rankings. 
Carrera questions how rankings are viewed by heads of local government agencies and their 
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effect in designing and implementing public policy in four Mexican cities. The paper argues for 
an ‘implied effect’ of such listings. He says that rankings are invariably prepared from the per-
spective of the organization that creates them, and while these are not always decisive, they 
contribute to ‘perceptions’ of social agents. The rankings, furthermore, serve to create a ‘bench-
mark’, or point of comparison.
The paper by Zhang and Wu on soft power indexes also references the concept of benchmark-
ing. They say that ‘Because of the ostensibly scientific nature of benchmarking exercises, the 
resulting rankings, once promulgated, are difficult to dislodge from public discourse’. A second 
problem is that the benchmarking process itself risks simplifying reality and assuming national 
performance as universally ‘evaluatable’, irrespective of historical and structural contexts. Using 
this critical framework, the paper examines two notable examples of national soft power, first the 
Portland Soft Power Index, also known as Soft Power 30, and second, the China National Image 
Global Survey. The paper investigates inherent bias in the structure of such ‘reports’. Notably, the 
Soft Power 30 epitomizes benchmarking that is imprinted by Western perspectives about soft 
power, namely Western values of liberalism. The China National Image Global Survey, on the 
contrary, relies exclusively on ‘subjective’ data derived from opinion polls, asking how other 
nations’ perceptions of China have changed. In essence, the Soft Power 30 passes itself as a global 
benchmark, claiming to use both quantitative and qualitative methods. The China National Image 
Global Survey is ostensibly about China reflecting on its place in the world, seen from the vantage 
of other nations.
The paper by Yecies, Keane, Yu, Zhao, Leong, Wu and Zhong references the Chinese term wen-
hua qiangguo, translated as both ‘cultural power’ and ‘cultural empowerment’. Wenhua qiangguo 
is used as a substitute for cultural soft power (wenhua ruanshili) in China. The paper discusses why 
cultural power is important to China. The first section of the paper considers the relationship 
between culture and power, providing examples from ‘great civilizations’ of the past. The paper 
argues that cultural power had considerable purchase in the western hemisphere until the late 20th 
century, a time when the focus of governments began to turn to creativity, along with various spin-
offs such as creative cities, creative economies and creative classes. The focus on creativity in 
China has taken a new direction with the emergence of China’s ‘digital champions’, sometimes 
abbreviated as BAT: Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent.
The second part of the paper briefly investigates several examples of indexes and their 
approaches, including the Portland Soft Power 30, the Lowy Asia Power Index, as well as a number 
of reports issued by Chinese academics. The Soft Power 30 index, as discussed in the previous 
paper, effectively privileges Western liberal democracies; the Lowy Asia Power Index, on the con-
trary, offers China a privileged position, although its choice of cultural indicators is questionable 
due to a heavy reliance on Google search. In the last section, the authors introduce the ‘Cultural 
Power Metric’ (CPM), an alternative model devised as part of an ongoing research project on the 
influence of Chinese digital platforms in the Asia-Pacific. The CPM attempts to apply big data 
methods to capture attitudinal and geo-locational changes over time.
The final paper by Karen Wong and Amy Dobson considers ‘social credit’, a term now used to 
describe China’s ambitious plan to merge financial credit score systems with a broader range of 
lifestyle quantifications. Wong and Dobson’s paper provides a timely analysis of this ‘credit sys-
tem’ in China (which is still being trialled) and comparable systems in Western liberal democra-
cies, mostly linked to ascertaining the creditworthiness of potential consumers. The paper argues 
that China’s advanced data collection, securitization, and management of populations may encour-
age other nation-states to follow the example, in this way, digitizing all aspects of social, cultural, 
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economic and political life. This scenario certainly raises questions about the relationship between 
governments, financial institutions, big data management systems and digital platforms.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
ORCID iD
Michael Keane  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8155-0140
References
Borgman, C. L. (2015). Big data, little data, no data: Scholarship in the networked world. Cambridge: MIT 
Press.
Hansen, V. (2012). The silk roads: A new history. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Lent, J. (2017). The patterning instinct: A cultural history of humanity’s search for meaning. Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books.
Muller, JA. (2018) The tyranny of metrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Woodside, A. (2006). Lost modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the hazards of world history. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
Author biographies
Michael Keane is Professor of Chinese Media and Communications at Curtin University, Perth, Western 
Australia. His research interests are digital transformation in China, East Asian cultural and media policy, 
television in China, and creative industries and cultural export strategies in China and East Asia.
Gary Rawnsley is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Nottingham 
Ningbo China. He is also Professor of Public Diplomacy and is the author or editor of over a dozen books, 
including the Routledge Handbooks of Chinese Media and Soft Power, and the forthcoming Edward Elgar 
Handbook of Political Propaganda.
